Abstract-Considering the wide application of network embedding methods in graph data mining, inspired by the adversarial attack in deep learning, this paper proposes a Genetic Algorithm (GA) based Euclidean Distance Attack strategy (EDA) to attack the network embedding, so as to prevent certain structural information from being discovered. EDA focuses on disturbing the Euclidean distance between a pair of nodes in the embedding space as much as possible through minimal modifications of the network structure. Since a large number of downstream network algorithms, such as community detection and node classification, rely on the Euclidean distance between nodes to evaluate the similarity between them in the embedding space, EDA can be considered as a universal attack on a variety of network algorithms. Different from traditional supervised attack strategies, EDA does not need labeling information, and, to the best of our knowledge, is the first unsupervised network embedding attack method.
I. INTRODUCTION
R Eal-world complex systems can be represented and analyzed as networks. During the past few decades, network science has emerged as an important interdisciplinary field aiming at using network and graph as a tool to characterize the structure and dynamics of complex systems including social networks, citation network, protein networks and transport vulnerable to such adversarial attacks.
For instance, due to the connectivity and cascading effects in networks, Faramondi et al. [29] analyze the robustness and vulnerability of complex networks. Waniek et al. [30] developed a heuristic method, namely Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally (DICE). They added perturbations to the original network by deleting the links within community while adding the links between communities. Chen et al. [24] proposed an attack strategy against community detection, namely Q-Attack, which uses modularity Q, under certain community detection algorithm, as the optimization objective, aiming to disturbing the overall community structure. Yu et al. [25] introduced an evolutionary method against link prediction using Resource Allocation Index (RA) so as to protect link privacy. As for node classification, Zügner et al. [26] proposed NETTACK to fool Graph Convolutional Networks (GCN) by generating adversarial networks. Chen et al. [27] further proposed Fast Gradient Attack (FGA) which utilized the gradient of algorithm to design loss function. FGA model can generate adversarial network faster and make the target nodes classified incorrectly with quite small perturbations. Moreover, Wang et al. [28] designed an greedy algorithm to attack GCNs by adding fake nodes. This method generated adjacency and feature matrices of fake nodes to minimize the classification accuracy of the existing nodes. Those kinds of attack strategies are always effective in most cases since they are strongly targeted at specific algorithms.
Most of the current attack strategies belong to the supervised learning, i.e., attackers can get true labels of nodes or communities, and further utilize these information to design attack strategies. However, in many cases, it is difficult and cost to collect such information, making those supervised attack strategies less effective.
In this paper, we focus on attacking the network embedding process, rather than some particular network algorithms. Since most network algorithms are based on network embedding, attacking the embedding process (instead of particular algorithms) could be a more generic approach that can be easily applied to various attack tasks. Different from FGA which is based on the gradient information of GCN, here we propose an Euclidean Distance Attack (EDA), aiming to directly disturb the distances between vectors in the embedding space. We think it's the vector distance that determines the performance of many downstream algorithms based on network embedding. Since we don't need to know the labels of training data, it can be considered as an unsupervised learning method. In particular, the main contributions of this paper are as below:
• We propose the first unsupervised attack strategy on network embedding, namely EDA, using the Euclidean Distance between embedding vectors as the reference.
• We adopt the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to search for the optimal solution for EDA. As compared with state-ofthe-art baseline attack strategies, EDA performed the best in reducing the prediction accuracy of downstream algorithms for community detection and node classification tasks.
• We validate the transferability of EDA in the reducing the performance of downstream network algorithms based on a variety of network-embedding methods. The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we introduce the EDA method. In Sec. III, we compare the performance of EDA and baseline strategies on attacking community detection and node classification algorithms in three real-world networks. Finally, we conclude the paper with discussions of future work in Sec. IV.
II. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first introduce DeepWalk briefly, based on which we propose the Euclidean distance attack (EDA) method. In particular, we turn the attack problem to a multiobjective optimization problem, and then use genetic algorithm (GA) to solve it. Here, we choose DeepWalk because it is one of the most widely-used unsupervised network embedding methods and it can has good mathematical properties rooted at matrix factorizations [31] .
A. DeepWalk
This paper mainly focuses on undirected and unweighted networks. A network is represented by G(V, E), where V denotes the set of nodes and E denotes the set of links. The link between nodes v i and v j is denoted by e ij = (v i , v j ) ∈ E. The adjacency matrix of the network then is defined as A, with the element denoted by
Real-world networks are often sparse and high-dimensional, preventing the wide application of machine learning algorithm in graph data. To address these problems, network embedding is a family of methods to encode the topological properties in the graph data into low-dimensional features. DeepWalk trains the vectors of nodes R |V |×n by calculating the probability of generating the nodes on both sides from the center node, with the loss function represented by
where the sequence {v i−w , · · · , v i−1 , v i+1 , · · · , v i+w } is obtained by random walk within the window w around the center node v i , and the probability P (v i+k |v i ) can be transformed by the following softmax function [32] , [33] :
where r i is the representation vector of node v i .
B. EDA on network embedding
Many machine learning methods are based on the relative, rather than absolute, positions of samples in Euclidean space. Thus the Euclidean distance between samples playing a key role in these methods. Moreover, due to the randomness of many network embedding algorithms, embedding vectors generated for the same node in different rounds might be different from each other. Regardless of such differences, the Euclidean distance between the same pair of nodes in the embedding space is approximately consistent. This is the key motivation that drives us to propose the Euclidean Distance Attack (EDA): Disturbing the Euclidean distance between pairwise nodes in the embedding space as much as possible with the minimal changes of the network structure.
In particular, we calculate the distance between a pair of nodes v i and v j in the embedding space as follows:
based on which we can get the Euclidean distance matrix D = [d ij ] |V |×|V | for the whole network, with each row denoted by D i representing the Euclidean distances between node v i and all the other nodes in the network. Denote the adversarial network after our EDA asĜ , and its corresponding Euclidean distance matrix in the embedding space asD. We calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient between the distance vectors of the corresponding nodes in the original network and adversarial network:
Then, we focus on minimizing ϕ by changing a certain number of links in the network with the following objective function:
C. Rewiring perturbation
Usually, we want the perturbation to be small enough to make the attack imperceptible for others. Taking this into consideration, we implement the attack as a rewiring process, i.e., adding a new link while deleting an existent one, so that the total number of links remains the same after the attack.
We denote the set of added links as E + ⊆ E and the set of deleted links as E − ⊆ E in the rewiring process, where E is the set of all pairs of unconnected nodes in G. Then, we get the adversarial networkĜ(V,Ê) with the updated set of linkŝ E satisfyingÊ
Suppose u links are rewired in the attack, the total number of instances in the searching space is equal to
which could become very huge as the size of the network or the number of rewiring links grows. The search for the optimal solution is NP, and thus we adopt the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to search for the optimal solution. The detailed procedure of EDA is presented in Algorithm 1.
D. The evolution of EDA
Here, we use the GA to find the optimal set of rewiring links for EDA. Typically, the algorithm consists of three parts: encoding of the network, selection by fitness, crossover and mutation operation: Fig. 2 . An example of crossover operation, where link (2, 8) in parent 1 and link (3,7) in parent 2 are exchanged to produce progeny. Fig. 3 . An example of crossover operation where a new link (3,7) is generated by mutation.
links. Fig. 1 shows an overview of network encoding. Individuals are combinations of rewiring links, representing different solutions of adversarial perturbations, and a population consists of h individuals.
• Selection by fitness: We use Eq. (9) as the fitness function of individual k in GA, capturing the relative changes of vector distances in the embedding space by the attack:
Then, the probability that individual k is selected to be the parent genes in the the next generation is proportional to its fitness:
• Crossover and mutation: We then use the selected individuals of higher fitness as the parents to generate new individuals by adopting crossover and mutation operations, assuming that those better genes can be inherited in the process. In particular, single point crossover between two individuals is used, with probability p c , as shown in Fig. 2 ; while for mutation, we randomly select individuals from a population and randomly change their genes, with probability p m , as shown in Fig. 3 .
III. EXPERIMENTS
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of EDA, we compare it with four baseline methods by performing multi-task experiments on several real-world networks.
A. Data sets
Here, we choose three commonly-used benchmark social networks to evaluate the performance of the attack strategies.
• Zachary Karate Club (Karate) [34] . The karate network is constructed by observing a university karate club, which consists of 34 nodes and 78 links. 
B. Baseline methods
We perform experiments on community detection and node classification to see how the proposed EDA degrades their performances. In particular, we compare the performance of EDA with that of the following baseline methods.
• Randomly Attack (RA). RA randomly deletes the existent links, while randomly adds the same number of nonexistent links. This attack strategy does not require any prior information about the network.
• Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally (DICE).
DICE is a heuristic attack algorithm for community detection [30] . The attacker needs to know the true node labels in the network and then delete the links within community and add the links between communities.
• Randomly Link Swaping (RLS). RLS is another strategy to randomize the networks. It can keep the degree of each node unchanged [37] . In each iteration, RLS randomly selects two links from the original network, and then exchanges their terminal nodes. We simply abandon the swapping operation if the newly established link already exists to avoid multiple links between a pair of nodes.
• Degree-Based Attack (DBA). It has been found that many real-world networks follow the power-law distribution [38] , in which a small fraction of nodes (usually named as hubs) have most connections. Since it is generally recognized that these hub nodes often have a huge impact on the connectivity of the network, here we also adopt another heuristic attack strategy named degreebased attack (DBA) [24] . Specifically, in each iteration, we select the node of the highest degree and delete one of its links; meanwhile, we select the node with the lowest degree and add a new connection between it and another randomly selected unconnected node. Then, we update the degrees of these nodes. DBA is only based on the structure of the network, but not on the labels and attributes of the nodes.
C. Parameter setting
For DeepWalk and GA, there are many parameters. In our experiments, the parameter setting is empirically determined through balancing the performance and convergence speed shown in Table. II. Note that different parameter settings may lead to various performances of these network algorithms, but our attack strategies will be still effective in degrading them. 
D. Attack on community detection
Community detection is one of the most common unsupervised learning problems in network science, aiming to identify the communities (a group of nodes that are closely connected with each other) in a whole network. There are many community detection algorithms. Here, to validate the effectiveness of different attack strategies on network embedding, we would prefer to first transfer nodes into vectors by DeepWalk and then realize the community detection by clustering these vectors in the embedding space by using K-means algorithm.
For each attack strategy, we rewire 1% to 6% links, and then use the above community detection method to identify communities. We use the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) to measure the performance [34] . NMI is used to evaluate the accuracy of a detected community. For two different categories of prediction C p and reality C t , it is defined as
where MI and H represent the Mutual Information and entropy, respectively, which are defined as
respectively, where |C p |, |C t | are the number of categories in the division of prediction and that of truth, respectively,
The value of NMI indicates the similarity between |C p | and |C t |, thus, the larger value, the more similar the prediction and the truth are.
For each attack strategy and each proportion of rewiring links, we carry out the experiments for 500 times and present the average result in Fig. 5 . In general, all the proposed attack strategy can effectively reduce the accuracy of community detection. More specifically, heuristic attack strategies, such as DICE and DBA, are more effective than RA; while the proposed EDA exhibits the best overall performance, with the lowest NMI in all the three networks. Quite impressively, as an unsupervised learn attack, EDA doesn't require any prior information of the communities to achieve superior performance. 
E. Attack on node classification
Different from the community detection problem, node classification is a typical supervised learning problem in network science which the label of some nodes are known. Again, here we would like to use DeepWalk to map nodes to vectors and then use Logistic Regression (LR) [39] to classify them, namely DeepWalk+LR. We use the same set of benchmark networks, since their real communities are in fact known beforehand. We randomly choose 80% of nodes as the training set and treat the rest as the test set, and use Micro-F1 and Macro-F1 to evaluate the classification results. We calculate the number of true positives (T P ), false positives (F P ), true negatives (T N ), false negatives (F N ) in the instances.
Macro-F1 and Micro-F1 are then defined as
respectively,where C P , C T are the category of in the division of prediction and that of truth, F 1(C P ) is the F1-measure for the label C P , and P r and R are calculated by
respectively. For multi-classification problems, Micro-F1 and Macro-F1 are used to evaluate the performance of the classification model. Similarly, for each attack strategy, we rewire 1% to 6% links, and then use the above two indicators to evaluate. For each case, we carry out the experiments for 500 times and present the average of results in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 . We find that both Micro-F1 and Macro-F1 decrease after each attack, regardless of the choice of the downstream classification algorithm (LR or KNN). In most cases, EDA still performs best, leading to the largest drop of Micro-F1 and Macro-F1. The heuristic attack strategies DICE is more effective than RA, consistent with the results in community detection. However, it seems that in certain cases when percentage of rewiring links is relatively small, heuristic methods may be more effective than EDA. This might be due to:
• First, comparing with DICE, which is a white-box attack method based on the real labels of nodes, EDA is a blackbox attack method without using label information.
• Second, GA has been recognized to have a tendency to be trapped in local optimum. But still, in the vast majority of cases, our proposed EDA is significantly more effective than the other attack strategies.
F. Transferability of EDA Generally, disturbing the distance matrix between node vectors in embedding space is equivalent to altering the similarity between nodes in the network, which will naturally affect other algorithms. We thus also examine the transferability of the proposed DeepWalk-based EDA method for other network algorithms.
In particular, we choose another network embedding method High-Order Proximity preserved Embedding (HOPE) [40] and two classic network algorithms, including Label Propagation Algorithm (LPA) [41] and Eigenvectors of Matrices (EM) [42] , which are not based on network embedding. HOPE utilizes the generalized SVD to handle the formulation of a class of highorder proximity measurements. HOPE is widely used due to its high effectiveness and efficiency. LPA sets the label of a node identical to most of its neighbors through an iterative process, while EM directly uses the modularity matrix to study the community structure. We use the two relatively large networks, i.e., Game and Dolphin, to study the transferability of EDA to avoid a cross-page table.
The results are shown in TABLE III. Although EDA is based on DeepWalk, it is still effective on HOPE-based node classification and community detection algorithms, i.e., HOPE+LR and HOPE+K-Means. Moreover, it is also effective on LPA and EM which are not based on any network embedding algorithm. In fact, EDA still outperforms the other heuristic attack strategies in most cases, suggesting that it has relatively strong transferability, i.e., we can generate small perturbations on the target network by EDA and destroy a number of network algorithms, no matter whether it is based on a certain network embedding method. 
G. Visualization and explanation
Statistics of rewiring links. To better understand how EDA works in reality, we visualize the distributions of the added and deleted links to see how many of them are within the same communities or across different communities. Taking the karate club network for example, we first present its original network and the adversarial network after one-link attack, as shown in Fig. 8 , where we can see that the added link is across two different communities while the deleted one is within the same community. To give more comprehensive results, we consider all the rewiring links in all the experiments for the three networks, and get the percentages of added links and deleted links within or between communities, respectively, as shown in Fig. 10 . We find that, indeed, most of the added links are across different communities, while most of the deleted links are within the same communities. This finding is quite interesting, since EDA focuses in disturbing the global structure of the network in Embedding space without any priori knowledge of communities. One reason may be that community is a critical structural property that matters the embedding results, and this is why EDA behaves quite well on attacking community detection algorithms.
The position of node vector. Furthermore, to show what EDA actually does to network embedding, we also visualize node vectors in a two-dimensional embedding space after the attack. For different percentages of rewiring links ranging from 1% to 7% in karate club network, we obtain the nodes vectors of original and adversarial networks using DeepWalk, and then display the results in a two-dimensional space, as shown in Fig. 9 . There are four communities represented by different colors. When there is no attack, the node vectors of different communities are clearly separated, as shown in Fig. 9 (a) . As the number of rewiring links increases, the node vectors of different communities are being mixed with each other gradually, and finally become inseparable, as shown in Fig. 9 (h) . This finding clearly demonstrates that EDA indeed has a significantly effect on network embedding, and can further disturb the subsequent community detection or node classification effectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the first unsupervised attack strategy, namely EDA, on network embedding, with the focus on disturbing the Euclidean distance between pairwise nodes in the embedding space as much as possible with minimal changes of the network structure. Since network embedding is becoming the basis of many network algorithms, EDA can be considered as a universal attack strategy which can degenerate many downstream network algorithms.
We take the DeepWalk as the basis to design our EDA, and a number of experiments on real networks validate that EDA is more effective than a set of heuristic attack strategies on degenerating community detection and node classification, no matter whether these algorithms are based on DeepWalk or other embedding methods, or even not based on embedding. Such results indicate the strong transferability of our method. Not that, our EDA is an attack on disturbing global network structure, and we may also focus on disturbing local structure around target nodes and links, to realize target attacks, which belongs to our future work. 
